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FORECLOSING ON THE AMERICAN DREAM: AN
EVALUATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL
FORECLOSURE LAWS
DEBRA POGRUND STARK*

Introduction'
Approximately sixty-five million Americans own their homes and were able to
purchase these homes with loans secured by real estate mortgages (in 1995 lenders
loaned more than three trillion dollars secured by residential real estate).2 The
purchase of these homes represents the largest single financial investment that most

individuals will make. In addition, individuals often experience a strong emotional
attachment to their homes. Consequently, the prospect of losing one's home in a real
estate foreclosure is both financially and emotionally devastating. On the other
hand, in order to make this dream affordable it is important for lenders to be able
to provide financing for these purchases at rates which provide a profit to the lender
but which borrowers can afford to pay. The more expensive the process to collect
on bad debt, the higher the interest rates or loan fees to future borrowers because
lenders pass along their collection costs to new borrowers. Recognizing these two
sides of the coin, each state has enacted foreclosure laws which attempt to balance
the interests of the defaulting borrower (protecting any equity she has in her
property) with the interests of the lender and future non-defaulting borrowers (a
foreclosure process which is as quick and inexpensive as possible).
© 1998 Debra Pogrund Stark. All Rights Reserved.
* Associate Professor, The John Marshall Law School; former chairperson, Foreclosure and Related
Remedies Committee of the Real Property Section of the American Bar Association, 1993-1997.
Professor Stark teaches Property, Real Estate Transactions, and Commercial Real Estate, and was a
founding member of and serves on the board of advisors of the school's LL.M Program in Real Estate
Law. Prior to joining the faculty and developing the school's graduate program in real estate law, she
practiced law with the Chicago office of Katten, Muchin and Zavis. She received her B.A. degree summa
cum laude from Brandeis University and her J.D. degree cum laude from Northwestern University School
of Law. Professor Stark thanks Rebecca Varan, Rebecca Williams and Colleen Adams, students at The
John Marshall Law School, for their valuable research assistance.
1. Portions of this article first appeared in Debra Pogrund Stark, Facing the Facts: An Empirical
Study of the Fairnessand Egciency of Foreclosures and a Proposalfor Reform, 30 U. MICH. J.L.

REFORM 639 (1997) [hereinafter Stark, Facing the Facts]. This study will be referred to in the text as
the "Empirical Study."
2. To get a sense of the amount of residential real estate foreclosures occurring recently in the
United States, it should be noted that in the fourth quarter of 1996, one percent of this debt (i.e., $30
billion) was delinquent to such an extent that the mortgagee elected to foreclose upon the real estate
mortgage which secured the debt. See Delinquencies on the Rise at Year-end, MORTGAGE
MARKETPLACE, Mar. 10, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7938104.
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Lenders charge that the foreclosure process in many states is too long and costly.
Due to the federal government's role as the insurer of many real estate loans and
provider of financing, Congress has also been concerned with the impact of
disparate state foreclosure laws on the many programs administered by the federal
government through its Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and
has enacted certain federal foreclosure laws which preempt state foreclosure laws
in certain circumstances, with the goal of reducing the time it takes to foreclose on
bad debts and to reduce the costs associated with the foreclosure process. In the
meantime, borrowers and their proponents claim that the current state foreclosure
laws are grossly unfair to borrowers. They claim that because third parties rarely
attend real estate foreclosures, the foreclosing lender is able to bid less than the
amount due to the lender at the foreclosure sale, recover the difference as a
deficiency judgment against the borrower, and then resell the property for a profit.
While many have criticized the foreclosure laws as unfair and inefficient, few
have collected data to test how fair and efficient foreclosure laws are in reality.
This author has conducted an empirical study of judicial foreclosures in Cook
County, Illinois (the Empirical Study)3 to test the accuracy of the conflicting
conventional wisdom with an eye towards utilizing the data collected to arrive at an
approach which can further the legitimate interests of both lenders and borrowers.
Illinois was chosen as the state from which to collect data because Illinois law falls
in the middle of the balancing approaches taken by the fifty states.4 Based upon the
results from the Empirical Study, this author contends that the federal government's
initiatives into this area of law are misguided and that there is a better way to
achieve efficiency without sacrificing the goal of fairness.
Part One of this article summarizes the basic laws and procedures for real estate
foreclosures in the fifty states, describes the foreclosure process and special features
in the State of Illinois (the location of the Empirical Study), and identifies the key
criticisms leveled at current foreclosure laws and procedures. Part Two describes
the two federal nonjudicial foreclosure laws and the proposed third federal
nonjudicial foreclosure bill. Part Three evaluates all of these foreclosure laws in
light of the results of the Empirical Study and certain data collected with respect to
powers of sale exercised by HUD. Part Four provides a proposal on how to reform
the foreclosure laws with respect to residential' real estate to better promote both

3. The author collected data with respect to every judicial foreclosure case filed in the Chancery
Court of Cook County, Illinois, in July 1993 and July 1994, ascertaining the percentage of cases which
were dismissed (through reinstatement, redemption, modification of the loan or bankruptcy filing) and
collecting data on the cases which sold at a foreclosure sale, including any resales of the property within
one year of the foreclosure sale. See Stark, Facing the Facts, supra note 1.
4. Illinois requires a judicial foreclosure and provides for a seven month redemption period for
residential properties which must be exercised before the sale, rather than after. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/15-1603(b)(1) (West 1993). Among the fifty states, the median period which passes prior to thejudicial
foreclosure sale is eight months and the median post-sale redemption period is six months for both
judicial and nonjudicial sales. See infra tbl. 1.
5. The author's reform proposal is confined to the setting of foreclosures of non-income producing
properties (i.e., "residential real estate"). There are many reasons for this limitation. First, the data
collected in the Empirical Study came overwhelmingly from residential real estate. Second, the dynamics
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fairness to the defaulting borrower (i.e., a realistic opportunity to protect any equity
she has in the mortgaged property) and efficiency to the lender (a process which is
as quick and inexpensive as possible consistent with the former goal of fairness)
based upon the results of the Empirical Study. Because the proposal promotes the
legitimate interests of both borrowers and lenders, it better reflects what a rational
lender and borrower would bargain for ex ante than do the current real estate
foreclosure laws in the fifty states or the federal foreclosure laws.
L State Real Estate ForeclosureLaws and Procedures
A. Summary of the ForeclosureProcedures Typically Utilized in the United States
A real estate mortgage is a pledge of the mortgagor's interes in the real estate,
as described in the mortgage document, which secures a specified debt! When the
mortgagor defaults in the payment of the debt or the performance of any other
obligations which the mortgagor has agreed to perform according to the terms of the
note, the mortgage, or any other loan documents, the loan documents usually
contain an acceleration clause which causes the entire indebtedness to become due
and payable. In the absence of the common law development of the equitable right
of redemption and statutory foreclosure laws, a lender and borrower could
theoretically agree that upon such default and acceleration the lender becomes the
fee title holder of the property pledged. English courts of equity, however,
developed the concept of an equitable right of redemption to prevent the harsh result
of a person who borrowed funds from losing his property if he was one day late in
paying the debt. Under the equitable right of redemption, a borrower has a certain
amount of time to pay off the debt and redeem the property, notwithstanding any
agreement to the contrary between the borrower and the lender. The foreclosure
process is the lawful process by which a lender can terminate this equitable right
of redemption, and the process is governed by state statute in each state in the
United States.
While each state has its own peculiar foreclosure laws and procedures, there are
certain basic features present in each state's statutory scheme. There exist two
dominant forms of foreclosure laws in America: a judicial foreclosure sale and a
nonjudicial foreclosure sale (known as a power of sale). In a judicial sale, the
mortgagee must bring a court action in order to foreclose the borrower's equitable
right to redeem the mortgaged property; in a nonjudicial or power of sale, the
mortgagee (or trustee under a deed of trust) may foreclose the borrower's equitable
right to redeem the mortgaged property without bringing a court action.

of commercial real estate are far different from residential real estate (the bankruptcy law protections
widely differ in the commercial context) (chapter 11 laws are quite different from chapter 13), appraisals
(a linchpin to the reform proposal) are more prone to variation in results in a commercial context than
in a residential one, and the issue of measuring the borrowers equity in the property is more complicated
in the commercial context.
6. This pledge is usually of an ownership interest, but it can also be a leasehold interest.
7. This debt is usually a debt of the mortgagor to the mortgagee.
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The following is the typical process followed in a jurisdiction whose statutes
require a judicial foreclosure sale: (1) the mortgagee or trustee records a notice of
default and sends to the mortgagor and any other party required pursuant to the
applicable state statute notice of the default and acceleration of the debt; (2) if the
mortgagor or other party allowed to cure the default fails to cure the default within
the specified statutory period after the notice of default, the mortgagee or trustee
sends out a notice of sale, which must be sent a certain period of time before the
date of the sale and must advertise the sale in a manner as required by statute; (3)
the foreclosure sale occurs in the manner prescribed by statute, unless the borrower
redeems or reinstates the loan.' Sometimes a mortgagor is not entitled to any postsale redemption rights in a nonjudicial sale and the mortgagee is not entitled to seek
a deficiency action against the mortgagor if the mortgagee has availed itself of this
quicker and less expensive process
From the lender's perspective, the nonjudicial sale is preferable to the judicial sale
because the nonjudicial sale can be performed more quickly"0 and at less expense.
Indeed, the fact that the lender can more quickly recover the collateral in a
nonjudicial foreclosure saves the lender not only the costs associated with the time
value of money but also may reduce the costs of restoring the property due to the
deterioration of the property that commonly occurs when property is in foreclosure.
The only negative aspects of the power of sale from the lender's perspective are that
sometimes the lender is unable to obtain a deficiency judgment when this form of
foreclosure is elected and the greater uncertainty with the validity of the foreclosure
action taken caused by the lack of court involvement.
From the borrower's perspective, the judicial sale is preferable. First, it generally
takes longer to perform a judicial sale than a power of sale and the borrower may
be able to reinstate or redeem the property during this longer time period. Second,
the borrower can raise any defenses to the foreclosure action to further delay the
procedure or, if successful with the defenses raised, have the foreclosure action
dismissed."
In only three jurisdictions (Connecticut, Illinois and Vermont) can a lender, under
certain limited circumstances, recover on the mortgaged property through what is
known as a "strict foreclosure."'" Under a strict foreclosure, the mortgagee must
bring a court action to foreclose on the property (unlike a power of sale which can

8. See A.B.A. SECTION ON REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST LAW, FORECLOSURE LAW &
RELATED REMEDIES: A STATE BY STATE DIGEST (Sidney A. Keyles ed., 1995) [hereinafter STATE BY
STATE DIGEST].
9. See id.; infra tbl. 1.
10. Table One reflects a median time period of fifty-six days to complete a power of sale and eight
months to complete a judicial sale according to the reports in STATE BY STATE DIGEST, supra note 8.
These periods not only cover statutory redemption periods, but also any other delays which arise like
court delays.
11. Although a borrower in a nonjudicial sale can seek some type of injunctive relief from the power
of sale if the borrower can show that the lender is not entitled to the power of sale, the burden of proof
shifts from the lender to the borrower to show that the lender is not entitled to this remedy.
12. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN & GERALD KORNGOLD, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 470-71 (3d ed.
1993).
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be accomplished without court involvement). In all three jurisdictions, the
mortgagor has a period of time to redeem the property after the court's judgment of
foreclosure and decree of the mortgagee as the owner of the property. There is no
public or private sale of the property.
In Connecticut, a strict foreclosure is permitted if, based on an appraisal of the
mortgaged property, it appears that the property is worth less than the debt and the
mortgagee is entitled to a judgment for the difference. 3 The Vermont statute does
not require an appraisal of the property to do a strict foreclosure. 4 In both
Vermont and Connecticut, the lender can sue the borrower for a deficiency even
when using a strict foreclosure (based on the difference between the amount of debt
and appraised value of the property). 5
In Illinois, a mortgagee can seek a strict foreclosure if the mortgagee can show
that the mortgagor is insolvent and the amount of the debt is greater than the value
of the mortgaged property. 6 Under Illinois law, if the mortgagee seeks a strict
foreclosure, the mortgagee has no right to a deficiency judgment. 7 Perhaps
because of the requirement to show that the mortgagor is insolvent and the lack of
guidelines in the Illinois statute on how to accomplish a strict foreclosure, the
process of strict foreclosure is rarely utilized.'
B. Basic Featuresof the Illinois Law
Illinois law requires a judicial sale and does not permit a power of sale.' The
Illinois statute provides for a six month redemption period for a commercial
mortgage and a seven month redemption period for a residential mortgage which
runs prior to the foreclosure sale? A mortgagor in a non-residential mortgage may
waive the statutory right of redemption at the time the commercial mortgage is first
made,2 ' but a mortgagor under a residential mortgage may not., A residential

13. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-24 (West 1994) (requiring a foreclosure by sale if the fair
market value of the property exceeds the debt due the foreclosing lender).
14. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4528 (1997); VT. R. Civ. P. 80.1; Dieffenbach v. Attorney General,
604 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1979); see GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATEUINANCE LAW
487-88 (3d ed. 1993). A foreclosure by sale can, however, be ordered if the mortgage authorizes this and
if either the plaintiff or any defendant requests this. Id. at 487.
15. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-14 (West 1994); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 14, at 487.
16. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 12, at 471.
17. See id.
18. See Stark, Facing the Facts, supranote 1, at 695. The results from the Empirical Study reflect
that not one of the 161 sales from the July 1993 foreclosure cases nor one of the 115 sales from the July
1994 foreclosure cases involved a strict foreclosure.
19. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1405 (West 1993). However, efforts are ongoing in the State
of Illinois to enact legislation which would permit a power of sale for large commercial loans.
20. To be more precise, the Illinois statute provides for a redemption period to run for the greater
of seven months from the date the court acquired jurisdiction over all mortgagors or three months after
at 5/15-1603(b)(1), and the greater of six
the judgment of foreclosure for a residential mortgage, see id.
months from the date the court acquired jurisdiction over all mortgagors or three months after the
judgment of foreclosure for non-residential mortgages, see id. at 5/15-1603(b)(2).
21. See id. at 5115-1601.
22. See id.
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mortgagor may waive the right of redemption or reinstatement after the commencement of the foreclosure action but only if the mortgagee waives the right to a
deficiency.' A residence is defined by the statute as containing six or fewer
dwelling units, at least one unit of which is occupied by the mortgagor or the
spouse of the mortgagor as his or her principal place or residence, except a single
tract of agricultural real estate larger than forty acres."' The mortgagor may
exercise the right of redemption, but other interested persons or entities (such as a
junior lienholder) may not exercise the right of redemption.' The mortgagor also
enjoys a right of reinstatement (a right to cure the default and reinstate the loan by
paying only the amount in default plus costs, rather than paying the entire
accelerated loan amount) which begins upon the filing of the foreclosure action and
which must be exercised before the earlier of the entry of the judgment of
foreclosure and ninety days after the mortgagor is served.26
If the mortgagor fails to redeem or reinstate the loan, a judicial sale occurs
following advertising and notice of the sale in the manner required by statute. It is
customary for the party bidding to be required to deposit ten percent of the bid price
upon the making of the bid and to pay the balance of the amount bid within fortyeight hours. If the amount of the successful bid at the sale is less than the final
judgment amount, the lender can sue for a deficiency; there is no prohibition on
pursuing a deficiency, no one-action rule and no fair value limitation.2 However,
a court must confirm the sale firste and can refuse to confirm a sale if proper
notices were not given, the terms of the sale were unconscionable, or justice was
not otherwise done.29 In addition to these statutory grounds to invalidate a
foreclosure sale, cases reflect the possibility of a setting aside of the foreclosure sale
if a grossly inadequate amount is bid combined with a defect in complying with the
foreclosure process." With respect to residential real estate, if the mortgagee elects
to sue the mortgagor for a deficiency, then the mortgagor is given a thirty day
redemption period after the foreclosure sale." With respect to residential real
estate, the mortgagor is entitled to possession until thirty days after the confirmation
of the sale. The mortgagee can seek possession prior to this date if the mortgagee
can satisfy certain requirements? 2
23. See id.
24. See id. at 5/15-1219.
25. See id. at 5/15-1603; 5/15-1402(b). Only the "owner of redemption" (defined in 5/15-1212 as
the mortgagor) may redeem from the foreclosure (unless the foreclosure is a consent foreclosure, in
which case a party other than the mortgagor who has an interest in the real estate and who objects to the
consent foreclosure may redeem in accordance with 5/15-1603(d)).
26. See id. at 5/15-1602. The right of reinstatement can only be exercised once every five years
unless good cause is shown to the court to be permitted to exercise the right more often than that.
27. See id. at 5/15-1504(f); 5115-1511.
28. See id. at 5/15-1508(e).
29. See id. at 5/15-1508(b).
30. See Debra Pogrund Stark, The Emperor Still Has Clothes: Fraudulent Conveyance Challenges
After the BFPDecision, 47 S.C. L. REv. 563, 583-98 (1996) [hereinafter Stark, Fraudulent Conveyance
Challenges].
31. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1604 (West 1993).
32. See id. at 5/15-1701. The mortgagee must (1) object during the foreclosure and show good cause
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Because of the redemption periods and court calendar delays, the foreclosure
process in Illinois usually takes nine months to complete even when no defenses are
raised." Even assuming no court delays, no defenses raised, and waiver of the
redemption period, the quickest the process can be completed is ninety days, due
to the time allowed to answer the complaint (thirty days from the service of
summons) and the publication requirements prior to the sale (a minimum of three
publications, each one week apart, the first notice being not more than forty-five
days prior to the sale and the last not fewer than seven days prior to the sale).'
C. Criticisms of the ForeclosureProcess
Two basic criticisms of the foreclosure process are that it is unfair and inefficient.
These criticisms are based upon the assumption that third parties rarely bid at a
foreclosure sale. As a result, the argument goes, the lender is able to bid far below
the fair market value of the property, resell the prpperty at a profit and sue the
borrower for the difference between the amount bid and the final judgment
amount." If this is how the foreclosure system routinely operates, the system
would clearly be unfair to borrowers and seriously flawed. If third parties rarely bid
at a foreclosure sale and the lender ends up with the property almost all of the time,
then the foreclosure sale process is also inefficient since the sale's process is costly
and time consuming with no corresponding gains to lenders or borrowers. As
previously mentioned, one of the key purposes of the Empirical Study is to test
which of these criticisms is well founded.
Assuming for the moment that third parties rarely bid at or close to the fair
market value of the property at a foreclosure sale (prior studies and this study
confirm this as fact),' it is not difficult to speculate why this is the case. First,
typical home purchasers may not even know that the property is for sale because
no signs are posted on the property and the sale is not advertised in the real estate
section of the newspaper (it is advertised in the legal section).37 Second, the bidder
is not given the opportunity to inspect the property prior to bidding on it. Third, at
the sale the bidder is customarily required to pay ten percent of the bid price
immediately and the balance in forty-eight hours (making it impossible to finance
the payment of the property with a conventional loan). Finally, in a number of
jurisdictions, the mortgagor can redeem the property within six months or more after

to be entitled to possession, (2) the mortgagee must be entitled to possession according to the loan
documents, and (3) the court must be satisfied that there is a reasonable probability that the mortgagee
will prevail on a final hearing of the cause. See id.
33. See Graphs, infra app. A, fig. A-15.

34. See STATE BY STATE

DiGEsT, supra note 8, at 155.
35. See, e.g., Steven Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosure by Sale as De FactoStrict
Foreclosure - An EmpiricalStudy of Mortgage Foreclosureand Subsequent Resale, 70 CORNELL L.

REV. 850, 853 (1985).

36. See id at 875.
37. The Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Act was modified in 1987 to require publication in both the

legal section of a newspaper and in the ordinary real estate sales section of a newspaper. See 735 ILL.
CoMp. STAT. 5/15-1507(c)(2) (West 1993).
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the foreclosure sale. These standard features of a foreclosure sale drive the typical
home purchaser out of the market. To the extent that third parties come to a
foreclosure sale and bid at the sale, they tend to be real estate investors who are
experienced in investing in real estate and are either cash rich or enjoy a line of
credit so that they can bid at the foreclosure sale and pay off the balance in fortyeight hours. These investors, commonly referred to as "scavengers," are aware that
risks inhere in purchasing property in this manner (such as the inability to inspect
the property prior to bidding at the foreclosure sale and the lack of warranties
regarding the physical condition of the house) and will, consequently, only bid when
they think they are bidding much less than the fair market value of the property.
Yet, the fairness issue is sometimes even more broadly construed. Some would
criticize a foreclosure process in which a lender or a third party is able to bid any
amount less than the fair market value of the property, even if this result occurred
infrequently. 8 The foreclosure sale should be reformed, according to those who
hold this view, to make the sale commercially reasonable so that the amount bid
reflects the fair market value, or the borrower should be able to recapture any gain
made upon a resale within a short period of time after the foreclosure sale.39 When
this article refers to a "fair" foreclosure process, it is not referring to a process
where the defaulting borrower's interest is considered to the exclusion of the
interests of the lender and all non-defaulting borrowers. A "fair" foreclosure system
is one that attempts to balance the interest of lenders and all non-defaulting
borrowers in an efficient foreclosure process against the interest of borrowers who
default in a process which provides a true opportunity and means to protect any
equity they have in the property in foreclosure. To the extent that the lender is not
made whole through the foreclosure process, the lender will transfer those costs to
all borrowers in the form of higher fees or interest rates and, consequently, lenders
and non-defaulting borrowers share an interest in keeping the costs of the
foreclosure process as low as possible.
D. Special Features of the Illinois Law
In order to address these problems, Illinois foreclosure law was modified in 1987.
The general purpose of the modifications to the Illinois foreclosure process was to
make the process more attractive to third parties in order to generate bids which
more closely approximate the fair market value of the mortgaged property. Two of
the key modifications made to encourage third party bidding were (i) to have the
statutory redemption period expire before rather than after the foreclosure sale and
(ii) to require that the sale be advertised not only in the legal notices section of a
newspaper but also in the real estate section of a newspaper. In addition, the
Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Act provides for fifteen "special matters" or
provisions in the judgment regarding the sale which may be sought, which were
intended to make the sale process more commercially reasonable and to result in

38. See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 35, at 886.
39. See id. at 884.
40. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1507(c)(2) (West 1993).
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more and higher third party bidding' The following are the special matters which
may be sought (these special matters do not automatically apply; the mortgagee may
request them in the complaint or the mortgagor may request them by separate
motion, in order for any of them to apply):
(1) a manner of sale other than public auction;
(2) a sale by sealed bid;
(3) an official or other person who shall be the officer to conduct the
sale other than the one customarily designated by the court;
(4) provisions for non-exclusive broker listings or designating a duly
licensed real estate broker nominated by one of the parties to
exclusively list the real estate for sale;
(5) the fees or commissions to be paid out of the sale proceeds to the
listing or other duly licensed broker, if any, who shall have procured the
accepted bid;
(6) the fees to be paid out of the sale proceeds to an auctioneer, if
any, who shall have been authorized to conduct a public auction sale;
(7) whether and in what manner and with what content signs shall be
posted on the real estate;
(8) a particular time and place at which such bids shall be received;
(9) a particular newspaper or newspapers in which notice of sale shall
be published;
(10) the format for the advertising of such sale, including the size,
content and form of such advertising, and additional advertising of such
sale;
(11) matters or exceptions to which title in the real estate may be
subject at the sale;
(12) a requirement that title insurance in a specified form be provided
to a purchaser at the sale, and who shall pay for such insurance;
(13) whether and to what extent bids with mortgage or other
contingencies will be allowed;
(14) such other matters as approved by the court to ensure sale of the
real estate for the most commercially favorable price for the type of real
estate involved.42
The Act also states:
If all of the parties agree in writing on the minimum price and that the
real estate may be sold to the first person who offers in writing to
purchase the real estate for such price, and on such other commercially
reasonable terms and conditions as the parties may agree, then the court

41. See id. at 5/15-1506(f).
42. Id.
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shall order the real estate to be sold on such terms, subject to confirmation of the sale ....
Theoretically, if the mortgagor or mortgagee moved the court to order that the
sale be done in accordance with some of these special matters, the result would be
a foreclosure sales price more closely reflecting the "fair market value" of the
property than the price which would be received in a typical foreclosure sale,
because these special matters were designed with the goal of attracting average
home purchasers to purchase the property foreclosed upon.
The special matters added to the Illinois act were an attempt to make the
foreclosure sales process more similar to a voluntary sale situation. Hence as
mentioned above, under the act, a broker can be hired to market and advertise the
sale in the conventional manner, the purchaser can be afforded the opportunity to
inspect the property, receive title insurance on the property, and have his bid be
subject to the condition that he is able to receive a loan commitment to finance the
purchase of the property. One catch, however, to these special matters was that
none of these special matters automatically applied; either the mortgagor or the
mortgagee had to motion the court for any of them to apply. The proponents of the
reform hoped that either the mortgagor or the mortgagee would move to utilize
some of these features in order to maximize the level of bidding at the foreclosure
sale.' As previously mentioned, the Empirical Study collected data on the extent
to which mortgagors and mortgagees sought to utilize any of these special features
and the impact, if any, that such special features had on bidding.
II. Federal ForeclosureLaws
Congress was also dissatisfied with the foreclosure laws in many states and
enacted legislation to preempt state foreclosure laws. Congress' concerns included
(1) long foreclosure procedures in many states which can lead to deterioration in the
condition of the properties, causing further management expenses, (2) the
availability of state redemption periods following the foreclosure sale in many
states, which discourages rehabilitation and improvements of the property, and (3)
high litigation expenses and overcrowded court calendars.4
As a result of these concerns about the expensive and time consuming nature of
the foreclosure process in many states (indeed, the foreclosure process, including
redemption periods, can take as long as one year in many jurisdictions),' Congress
enacted the Multifamily Mortgage Foreclosure Act of 1981 (MFMFA),47 which
permits HUD to perform a quick, nonjudicial sale with respect to multifamily
mortgage loans held by HUD. Due to the same concerns applying in the context of

43. Id. at 5/15-1506(g).
44. See Jeffrey Liss, Notices of ForeclosureSales Under the New Law, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Oct.
8. 1987, reprinted in FORECLOSURES INILLINOIS 1-25, 1-28 (1. Inst. for Continuing Legal Educ. ed.,
1988).
45. 12 U.S.C. § 3701 (1994).
46. See STATE BY STATE DIGEST, supra note 8; infra tbl. I.
47. Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 422 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3715 (1994)).
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single family residential mortgages and an escalating backlog in the handling of
judicial foreclosures for HUD,' Congress, in 1994, enacted the Single Family
Mortgage Foreclosure Act (SFMFA) 9 The SFMFA permits HUD to perform a
nonjudicial sale with respect to single family mortgage loans held by HUD. In an
effort to expand the application of the federal nonjudicial foreclosure process,
Congress, in 1995, almost successfully amended the House Budget Bill to add yet
a third federal nonjudicial foreclosure law, the Federal Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act
(FNFA), 0 which would have permitted certain defined "federal agencies" to engage
in a similar nonjudicial sales process with respect to real estate mortgage loans they
hold to be in default. This section of the article will address what transactions are
covered by these laws and proposed bill and the impact on state foreclosure laws.
A. Application of the Multi-Family Mortgage ForeclosureAct
The Multifamily Mortgage Foreclosure Act applies to mortgages held by the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (Secretary) pursuant to various
federal insurance and development programs." Although the statute does not
define "multifamily," the Rules and Regulations to the MFMFA state that with two
exceptions, "multifamily mortgage" does not include a property on which there is
located a one- to four-family residence." Courts have enforced the MFMFA with
respect to mortgages entered into prior to the effective date of the law (i.e.,
retroactively).'
B. Application of the Single Family Mortgage ForeclosureAct
The Single Family Mortgage Foreclosure Act applies to mortgages covering
property on which there is located a one- to four-family residence, which are held
by the Secretary pursuant to certain programs administered by HUD.54 Probably
the largest source of loans which would be subject to the SFMFA is FHA insured
loans assigned to HUD before foreclosure. In 1996, the number of mortgage loans

48. This backlog in the handling of judicial foreclosures for HUD was apparently caused by staffing
problems in the U.S. Attorney Offices. See Nelson A. Diaz, HUD'sNew ForeclosureAct: CuttingLosses
and Improving Business Management, 68 N.Y. ST. B.J. 30 (1996).
49. Pub. L. No. 103-327, 108 Stat. 2316 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3751-3768 (1994)).
50. H.R. 2234, 104th Cong. (1995).
51. See 12 U.S.C. § 3702(2)(A)-(E) (1994). This section refers to various sections of various statutes
pertaining to the following programs: War Housing Insurance, Armed Services Housing Mortgage
Insurance, Mortgage Insurance under the National Housing Act, Mortgage Insurance for Land
Development and New Communities, Urban Renewal Projects, Demolition Programs and Code
Enforcement Programs, section 202 of the Housing Act of 1959, and Section 811 of the CranstonGonzalez National Affordable Housing Act (covering congregate housing services).
52. See 61 Fed. Reg. 48,546, 48,553 (1996). The two exceptions are for one- to four-family
residences subject to a mortgage pursuant to section 202 of the Housing Act of 1959 or subject to a
mortgage pursuant to section 811 of the National Affordable Housing Act.
53. See Lisbon Square v. United States, 856 F.Supp. 482, 490 (E.D. Wis. 1994).
54. See 12 U.S.C. § 3751(b)(l)-(2) (1994). This section refers to the following programs
administered by HUD: home improvements under Title I or mortgage insurance under Title II of the
National Housing Act; and slum clearance, urban renewal projects, demolition programs, and code
enforcement programs under 42 U.S.C. § 1452b.
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under the Title II insurance program was estimated at 92,000." The SFMFA does
not expressly indicate whether it applies to mortgages entered into before the
effective date of the law, but it appears that Congress intended this retroactive
application in light of the definition of mortgage loans contained in the bill which
does not exclude mortgages entered into prior to the law's effective date.
C. Application of the Proposed Federal Nonjudicial ForeclosureAct
The proposed federal foreclosure law applies to all federal loans and loans held
by federal agencies. Under the proposed federal foreclosure law, "agency" is
defined as an executive department, an independent establishment, a military
department, or a wholly owned government corporation." An executive department
is defined as one of the fourteen departments in that branch." Therefore, a loan
held by one of these departments, regardless of whether the department originated
the loan, is covered as a federal agency under the proposed federal foreclosure bill.
An independent establishment is defined as "an establishment in the executive
branch (other than the U.S. Postal Service) which is not an executive department,
military department, government corporation, or part thereof."59 The third possible
category of agency applies to loans held by a military department. The Army,
Navy, and Air Force are considered to be military departments.' Therefore, any
loans held by the military department would be subject to the proposed federal
foreclosure bill. Lastly, the proposed federal foreclosure law applies to foreclosed
property which is held by wholly owned government corporations. Examples of
such corporations include, but are not limited to, the Community Credit Corporation,
the Community Development Federal Institutions Fund, and the Government
National Mortgage Association.6'
Thus, while the proposed federal foreclosure law would apply to all loans held
by the above described federal agencies (including HUD, SBA, VA, FmHA, and
GNMA),' the bill does not cover loans held by federally related or partly federal

55. See Diaz, supra note 48, at 30.
56. See H.R. 3019, 104th Cong. § 3402 (1996).
57. See id. § 3401.

58. See 5 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). An executive department includes the following: Department of
State, Department of Treasury, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of Interior,
Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of Labor, Department of Health and
Human Services, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department of Transportation,

Department of Energy, Department of Education, and the Department of Veterans Affairs.
59. See id. § 104.
60. See id.§ 102.
61. See id. § 9101. The remaining wholly owned government corporations include the Export-Import
Bank of the United States, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, the Federal Prison Industries, Inc.,
the Corporation for National and Community Service, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development when carrying out duties and powers related to the Federal
Housing Administration Fund, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Uranium Enrichment Corporation,
the Panama Canal Commission, and the Alternative Agricultural Research and Commercialization
Corporation.
62. See Patrick Randolph, Jr., The New Proposed FederalForeclosureLaw, 1996 PLI/REAL 451,
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entities, such as FDIC, FSLIC, FNMA, or FHLMC.' The FNFA expressly states
that it will apply to mortgages executed both prior and subsequent to the proposed
effective date of the bill."
D. A Comparison of the Procedures Under the FederalNonjudicialForeclosure
Laws to State ForeclosureLaws
The two existing federal foreclosure laws and the proposed bill contain basically
the same nonjudicial foreclosure process which would preempt any state foreclosure
law to the contrary.' In all three bills, a notice of default and foreclosure sale
must be sent to the borrower at least twenty-one days before the sale; the sale must
be advertised once each week for three weeks before the sale; the sale must be
conducted by a commissioner appointed by HUD or other appropriate federal
agency; the borrower can reinstate the loan up to three days before the sale and can
redeem at anytime before but not after the sale; the borrower can contact the
commissioner to contest the notice of default and sale but the commissioner is
granted discretion to respond to any contest as well as to accept an attempted offer
to reinstate the loan if the borrower had at anytime earlier reinstated the loan; the
sale is conclusively presumed to be valid; and HUD or the other appropriate federal
agency can bring a deficiency action against the borrower.
In short, these federal nonjudicial foreclosure laws combine the harshest features
of foreclosure processes currently in existence under state laws and together provide
the least protection to defaulting borrowers in comparison with the laws in each of
the fifty states. The laws provide no requirement for a commercially reasonable
sale, no post-sale redemption rights, no protection against deficiency judgments, no
judicial process to ensure that the lender is indeed entitled to the remedy of
foreclosure for the amount claimed, and a conclusive presumption that the sale is
valid, and only eighteen days to reinstate the loan and twenty-one days to redeem
the loan after the notice of default and sale is sent.
States have almost universally enacted much longer redemption periods than
twenty-one days (most states' redemption periods are at least three months to six
months),' have sometimes enacted anti-deficiency legislation when a lender
exercises a statutory power of sale,67 and, in the many states which require a
judicial sale, have often required judicial review of the right of the lender to
foreclose as well as judicial review of the validity of the sale' (with courts

453-54 (1996).
63. See id. at 454.
64. Proposed Amendment to Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, § 3402D, 142 CONG. REC.
S2132 (Mar. 13, 1996).
65. Although there is no express preemption language in the MFMFA or the SFMFA, the purpose
of Congress in enacting these laws was precisely to preempt state law to the contrary and this intent to
revise the process in reaction to cumbersome and problematic state foreclosure laws is mentioned in the
findings of fact sections of the acts. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3701a-3701b, §§ 3751a-3751b (1994).
66. See STATE By STATE DIGEST, supra note 8; infra tbl. I.
67. See STATE BY STATE DIGEST, supra note 8.

68. See id.
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invalidating sales based upon unconscionable bids or a procedural defect combined
with a grossly inadequate bid).' States have enacted these protections to defaulting
borrowers in an effort to provide such borrowers with a meaningful opportunity to
protect any equity they have in their property.
Each state's foreclosure laws contain that state's legislative determination of how
best to balance the defaulting borrower's interests with the interest of the lender and
all future non-defaulting borrowers in an efficient realization of the collateral after
the mortgage loan goes into default. The federal nonjudicial foreclosure laws
eradicate the balance struck by each state legislature.
While one can argue that many states have done an inadequate job at properly
balancing the competing interests of the defaulting borrower and lender and that
providing a uniform federal standard would be easier to administer, the federal
initiatives unnecessarily sacrifice the interests of the defaulting borrower to promote
the lender's interest in a quicker and cheaper foreclosure process. As will be
discussed in the next part of this article, the Empirical Study underscores the unfair
nature of the federal foreclosure laws and, surprisingly, underscores the inefficiency
of the federal foreclosure process as well.70
III. An Evaluation of Federaland State Foreclosure
Laws in Light of EmpiricalData
This part of the article will evaluate whether the federal nonjudicial foreclosure
processes are fair and efficient by focusing on certain key aspects of these laws: (i)
the short reinstatement and redemption period, (ii) the right to pursue a deficiency,
and (iii) the use of a power of sale. Further, in evaluating these aspects of the
federal foreclosure procedures, this article will focus on whether these features are
fair and efficient in light of the results of the Empirical Study.
A. The Short Reinstatement and Redemption
One of the most surprising results from the Empirical Study was the large
percentage of cases filed which did not go to foreclosure sale. The data from the
Empirical Study reflected that in over two-thirds of the cases the borrower was able
to prevent a sale of the property by exercising a statutory ninety day right of
reinstatement, by exercising the right to redeem (a seven month period for

69. See Stark, Fraudulent Conveyance Challenges, supra note 30, at 563.
70. In addition to the inefficiency of imposing a forced sale of the mortgaged property when the
borrower lacks any equity in the property (a point which will be developed in the next portion of this
article), it is ironic that Congress' most recent efforts (a proposed bill that has not yet been enacted) to
expedite and reduce the costs of the foreclosure process went so far that some claim their efforts may
backfire; that the lack of a hearing and lack of adequate notice to junior lienholders could render the
proposed act susceptible to constitutional challenge. See Randolph, supra note 62, at 458-59. Indeed,
title insurers have been wary to afford title insurance with respect to foreclosures even under the existing
federal foreclosure laws, but will do so if the foreclosure commissioner executes an affidavit that the
statutory requirements have been met. See Steven Bashaw, Federal Nonjudicial Foreclosure Laws: Are
We Moving Towards a National Foreclosure Law 16 (Aug. 3, 1997) (ABA Annual Meeting Program)
(on file with author).
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residential properties in Illinois) prior to the sale (which borrowers accomplished
often times by refinancing or selling the property), by entering into a workout with
the lender, or by filing a bankruptcy action to stay the foreclosure sale. Figures A-5
and A-6, following the text of this article, detail how borrowers in over two-thirds
of the cases filed were able to prevent the foreclosure sale from occurring.
By providing only twenty-one days to redeem and only eighteen days to reinstate
the loan, the federal legislation deprives borrowers of a meaningful opportunity to
exercise those rights, rights which in two-thirds of the cases in Illinois borrowers
utilized to preserve their equity in the property and save their homes (the vast
majority of the cases in the data sample were residential). In the 1994 cases in the
Empirical Study, the median period to redeem was four months and in the 1993
cases the median period to redeem was nine months."
In defending the limited time period under the federal nonjudicial foreclosure
bills, one could argue that since HUD has in the past typically refrained from
commencing the foreclosure for a very long period after a default has occurred (it
was not uncommon for years to pass between the default and the foreclosure sale)'
it is thus fair to allow it a very quick process to foreclose once it elects to foreclose.
However, if these delays were due to lack of resources to handle the default or
mismanagement by HUD, with no meaningful efforts to assist the borrower in
converting a defaulted loan into a performing loan, then these delays did not serve
any party's interest and instead merely lulled the borrower into a false sense of
security. As a point of comparison, lenders in the Empirical Study waited a median
of six to seven months from the default until they filed a foreclosure action.' A
review of the files for the 53 cases reflect that HUD has been successful in very
quickly moving from the Notice of Default and Foreclosure sale in these cases to
completion of the sale, with a median period of thirty days between the notice and
the sale.
B. The Right to Pursue a Deficiency
The federal foreclosure procedures, similar to the laws in the states (including
Illinois) do not require that the sale procedure be "commercially reasonable" (i.e.,
the property to be sold does not have to be marketed by a broker and sold under

71. See Stark, Facing the Facts, supra note 1, at 690.
72. This author filed a Freedom of Information Act Request with HUD and was given access to the
files it keeps in its Chicago, Illinois office with respect to completed foreclosures under the SFMFA (a
total of 53 cases). Of these 53 cases which were foreclosed under the SFMFA, the median period HUD
waited from the default until it sent a notice of default and of the nonjudicial foreclosure sale was three
years and eight months. In explaining this long period, it should be noted that the default occurred in
the bulk of these cases between 1992 and 1996 but that the SFMFA was not enacted until 1994 and the
regulations implementing the SFMFA were not in effect until 1995. This author was not given access
to its "active" files (i.e., files involving loans currently in default and in which the foreclosure sale has
not yet been completed) and was advised that HUD did not keep records of loans in default where the
loan default was cured or the loan paid off. Thus, this author could not ascertain the percentage of cases
where a loan was in default and the borrower able to prevent a foreclosure sale as was ascertained in the
Empirical Study.
73. See Stark, Facing the Facts, supra note 1, at 711.
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terms which mirror the way property would be sold in a voluntary sale). The data
from the Empirical Study reflects that in approximately ninety percent of the cases
that went to sale the debt on the property exceeded the fair market value of the
property at the time of the foreclosure, and in approximately ten percent of the cases
the fair market value of the property exceeded the outstanding debt (i.e., in only
approximately ten percent of the sales cases was a third party the successful bidder
at the sale, and the lender made a profit upon resale in only twelve percent of the
cases).7 In ninety percent of the cases, where the amount of the debt exceeded the
fair market value of the property, it does not matter whether the foreclosure sale
was commercially reasonable in terms of protecting the borrower's equity in the
property (assuming that the lender does not pursue a deficiency action against the
borrower). As previously indicated, the federal nonjudicial foreclosure procedures
also permit the lender to pursue a deficiency action based upon the difference
between the amount bid at the sale and the outstanding debt. This author was told
by an official at HUD that HUD does not pursue deficiencies against borrowers
after a foreclosure sale under SFMFA," but this author was unable to independently verify this. Once again, however, there is nothing preventing HUD or any
other federal agency from changing its practices and beginning to pursue deficiencies, since single family residential loans are typically structured as recourse loans.
Admittedly, this would occur rarely since HUD correctly assumes that in the vast
majority of the cases if a borrower has assets she would use those assets to prevent
the foreclosure sale. Lenders in Illinois also have the right to pursue a deficiency
based upon the difference between the foreclosure sale amount and the outstanding
debt. Lenders brought a deficiency action within one year after the foreclosure sale
in approximately six to seven percent of the foreclosure sale cases of the Empirical
Study and in approximately two percent of the cases did so even after profiting after
a resale of the property.76 Thus, the fact that the sale is not required to be
commercially reasonable caused a loss of the borrower's equity in its property in
only a small percentage of the cases examined in the Empirical Study, but the study
does confirm that the use of a non-commercially reasonable sale and the right to a
deficiency can lead to highly inequitable results in some cases.
C. The Use of a Power of Sale
The third key facet of the federal foreclosure process this article analyzes is the
use of a power of sale, as opposed to a judicial proceeding. In only one percent of
the 1993 cases and in none of the 1994 cases in the Empirical Study did the
borrower raise a defense to the foreclosure action in the judicial proceeding (all of
the defaults in the cases in the Illinois Study were monetary as opposed to nonmonetary defaults).' Thus, one could argue that, because borrowers rarely take

74. See id. at 692.
75. Conversation with Bill Walls, Supervisor, Single Family Asset Management, Department of
Housing and Urban Development (Feb. 5, 1998).
76. See Stark, Facing the Facts, supra note 1, at 665.
77. See id at 695.
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advantage of the judicial process, lenders should be able to foreclose without a
judicial process, especially one involving federal agencies where one is less likely
to find bad faith actions than one might if the lender is the provider of a home
improvement loan. However, as a matter of public perception, it does appear
incongruous that a court action is required to recover on a credit card balance of
fifty dollars but is not required to foreclose a mortgage on a house. There is also
the issue of the fairness of shifting the burden of proof from the lender to the
borrower when the borrower has to bring an action to enjoin the power of
foreclosure sale.!8 Finally, some argue that borrowers do not really take notice of
the serious nature of their situation until they receive a summons to appear in court
(though this assertion has not been tested, to this author's knowledge). For all of
these reasons, if there were a way to reduce the time and costs of the foreclosure
process without resorting to a power of sale, this alternative would be preferable.
D. Are the State or FederalForeclosureLaws Efficient?
The inadequacy of the federal nonjudicial foreclosure process in protecting any
equity of the borrower in the mortgaged property is obvious (especially in light of
empirical data which reflects that most borrowers will exercise rights of
reinstatement and redemption if given an adequate time period), but less obvious is
how the federal nonjudicial foreclosure process and state foreclosure procedures are
inefficient. The data from the Empirical Study reflects that in approximately ninety
percent of the cases that actually did go to foreclosure sale, the borrower had no
equity in the property (i.e., in only approximately ten percent of the sales cases was
a third party the successful bidder at the sale, and the lender made a profit upon
resale in only twelve percent of the cases).79 Thus, in the vast majority of the cases
that went to foreclosure sale there was no reason to require a forced sale of the
property (i.e., in ninety percent of the cases the borrower had no equity in the
property worth protecting through the requirement of an involuntary sale), and in
none of the fifty-three SFMFA cases was a third party the successful bidder (HUD
was the successful bidder in each of the fifty-three cases). By continuing to require
a forced sale of the mortgaged property in all cases, both the federal nonjudicial
foreclosure process and state foreclosure laws add an unnecessary expense. Hence,
the federal nonjudicial foreclosure laws and the state foreclosure laws are inefficient
as well as unfair. The same criticism could be leveled at the Uniform Land Security
Interest Act (a proposal to reform the foreclosure process that has not been enacted
in any state), which attempts to reduce the costs of the foreclosure process by
allowing a nonjudicial sale to take place with respect to residential real estate in as
few as ten weeks (with no post-sale redemption period), but which would also
require a forced sale of the property even when there is no equity in the property.'

78. See id. at 685.
79. See id. at 692, 695.
80. See James M. Pedowitz, Uniformity in Mortgage Foreclosures,PROB. & PROP., Feb. 7, 1993,
at 56, 58. On the other hand, the Uniform Land Security Interest Act does require a "reasonable" sale
(providing bidders with five weeks to pay the balance of the bid price after the foreclosure sale).
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Based upon the data collected from the Empirical Study and the data collected
with respect to foreclosure sales by HUD under the SFMFA, the largest component
of costs in the foreclosure process was the accrued interest." Indeed, in the fiftythree HUD nonjudicial cases studied, the accrued interest is much higher than in the
judicial foreclosure cases in the Empirical Study because the median time period
between default and the foreclosure sale was so much longer in the HUD cases than
in the Empirical Study cases.' The principal additional costs in the judicial
foreclosures examined in the Empirical Study which could be identified from a
review of the court files were the following: title examination costs, filing fees and
summons charges, recording charges, publishing costs, copying costs, and attorney's
fees.' The principal additional costs which could be identified from a review of
the HUD files with respect to SFMFA sales were: advertising costs, title insurance
costs, recording fees, and the foreclosure commissioner's fee. Because the median
mortgage amounts for the Empirical Study are very close to the median mortgage
amounts in the fifty-three cases examined where HUD utilized the SFMFA,' it is
useful to compare the median dollar amounts expended in the Empirical Study cases
(excluding accrued interest and additional advances since those figures relate to the
timing of the decision to foreclose after the default; a topic covered in the next
section of this article) against the median dollar amounts for the costs identified in
the HUD files regarding SFMFA sales cases (which also excludes accrued interest
and additional advances). The median total amount of these costs in the 1993
judicial foreclosure cases was $2,422.25 and the median total amount of these costs
in the 1994 judicial foreclosure cases was $2,484.98." Surprisingly, the total
median amount of the costs identified above for the HUD nonjudicial sales was
$1,806, a number which is close to the judicial sales figures. Expressed as a
percentage of the original amount of the mortgage loan, these costs amounted to
approximately five percent of the original mortgage amount for the judicial cases
and 3.4% of the original mortgage amount for the HUD nonjudicial cases. The lack

81. See Stark, Facing the Facts, supra note 1, at 709; infra fig. A-14. While the median mortgage
amount for the HUD, SFMFA loans was $52,362, the median foreclosure sales price (a price that is
reflective of the total debt due in light of accrued interest and certain other charges later described which
amounted to the median amount of $1806) was a much larger $91,798. By comparison, the median
original mortgage amount for the 1993 judicial sales cases in the Empirical Study was $48,600 and the
median final judgment amount for those cases was only $62,646. See Stark, Facingthe Facts,supra note
1, at 667. The main component for this difference must be the larger accrued interest in the HUD loans
due to the longer forbearance period for these loans. See id. at 711.
82. See Stark, Facing the Facts, supra note 1, at 711; see supra note 72 (comparing a three year,
eight month median forbearance period by HUD in the SFMFA loans to the six- to seven-month median
forbearance period in the Empirical Study cases); infra app. A, fig. A-14.
83. The costs for additional advances is excluded for purposes of the comparison since that figure

is tied to the amount of time the lender waits between the default and the sale (similar to the accrued
interest figure) and this figure could not be ascertained from the HUD files reviewed.
84. The median mortgage amount for the HUD SFMFA cases was $52,362; the median mortgage
amount for the 1993 cases in the Empirical Study was $48,000 and for the 1994 cases was $49,000. See
Stark, Facing the Facts, supra note 1, at 667.
85. See Stark, Facing the Facts, supra note I, at 709.
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of a larger savings for these secondary costs (i.e., costs not including accrued
interest and additional advances) in the nonjudicial process is due in part to the
median fee charged by the foreclosure commissioner ($800), which is almost
identical with the legal fees the lender's attorneys charge to do the judicial
foreclosure (thus leaving a savings based primarily upon the filing fees, service
charges and sales fee).'
In summary, there is a savings of only 1.6% when comparing the costs of
performing a judicial foreclosure in Illinois to performing a nonjudicial foreclosure
under the SFMFA (exclusive of the additional interest and additional advance costs).
The means to reduce these costs consistent with basic concerns of fairness to the
defaulting borrower are addressed in the next section of this article.
IV. Is There a Better Way to Promote Both Fairness to the Defaulting Borrower
and Efficiency to the Lender?
The data collected in the Empirical Study suggest a better way to handle
residential" real estate foreclosures - one which would better protect the
borrower's equity in the property, if any, and would provide a more efficient process
than is found in the fifty states or even in the federal procedures. This author
recommends a bifurcated foreclosure process. Foreclosures would either be judicial
strict foreclosures or judicial foreclosures with a required commercially reasonable
sale of the property. After (i) the foreclosure action is filed and the mortgagor is
served, and (ii) a ninety day reinstatement period has expired, the court!s will order
an appraisal of the value of the mortgaged property which must be completed before
the judgment of foreclosure.' If the amount of the appraisal reflects a value of the
property which is less than the debt due on the date of the judgment of foreclosure
plus a percentage of said judgment amount as set forth in the statute, the property
is deeded to the lender on the date of the judgment of foreclosure (i.e., a judicial
strict foreclosure with no public sale). The statute would require the passage of a
four month period from service of the mortgagor before the judgment of foreclosure

86. The Sheriffs office charge for conducting the sale went down to $250 after Illinois modified
its foreclosure laws to permit a private entity to perform the sale. See id.
This added competition has
driven down the prices charged for this service.
87. See supra note 5 for an explanation of why the proposal is confined to the context of residential
real estate as opposed to income producing property.
88. The court rather than the lender should order the appraisal and the standards for how the
appraisal should be prepared should be spelled out in the statute (such as a "blind" appraisal where the
appraiser is not given a goal number and is instructed to appraise the fair market value of the property,
instead of the value as affected by the foreclosure process) to avoid the fudging that sometimes occurs
with an MAI (sometimes referred to in derision as a "Made As Instructed" Appraisal).
89. The statute would permit a judgment of foreclosure within four months after service of
summons, giving one month to obtain the appraisal.
90. The percentage set forth in the statute would be based upon studies collecting data on the
median costs lenders incur to carry the property, the median time period for carrying property until it can
be sold in a commercially reasonable manner, and the median costs of the sale of the property. The
Illinois study roughly estimated this percentage at 14% based upon an assumed carrying time of six
months and an assumed median resale price of $75,000. Stark, Facing the Facts, supra note 1, at 676.
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could occur and would give no discretion to a court to postpone the judgment date
without agreement of the borrower and lender. The borrower would have a ninety
day statutory right of reinstatement and a statutory redemption which can be
exercised anytime before the expiration of said four month period."' There would
be no right of redemption after the judgment of foreclosure.
If, however, the amount of the appraisal exceeds the judgment amount by more
than the required specified percentage, then if the borrower failed to exercise the
ninety day reinstatement right and failed to redeem within four months (and if any
junior mortgagees fail to redeem within said four month period), the property must
be sold in a manner which is commercially reasonable,' and the borrower and any
junior mortgagees would have no further redemption rights after the sale.
The purpose of requiring that the appraisal reflect a value of the property which
is a specified percentage in excess of the judgment amount is to make certain that
the borrower has sufficient equity in the property before requiring the lender to
undergo the more expensive and time consuming commercially reasonable sales
process. For example, if, after study, it becomes apparent that on average it costs
a lender ten percent of the judgment amount to pay for performance of the
commercially reasonable sale and the costs the lender incurs in carrying the property
from the date of the judgment of foreclosure until the property sells, then unless the
appraisal reflects a value of the property which exceeds ten percent of the judgment
amount, the borrower does not have any true equity in the property worthy of
requiring the more costly process of a commercially reasonable sale. Prior to
reforming the foreclosure process, further data should be gathered to determine what
these costs typically would amount to calculated as a percentage of the judgment
amount and that figure should be applied in the statute as the amount by which the
appraised value exceeds the judgment amount in order to require the commercially
reasonable sale as opposed to a strict foreclosure.
Lenders would benefit from a reform which bifurcates the foreclosure process
since the more expensive and commercially reasonable foreclosure process will only
be required when an appraisal reflects that the borrower has sufficient equity in the
property and the borrower still fails to reinstate or redeem the loan prior to the
judgment of foreclosure (according to the data from the Empirical Study, this should
rarely occur). When the appraisal reflects that the borrower has no equity in the
property (which should be the majority of the cases which go to foreclosure sale
according to the data from the Empirical Study), the lender will be able to take title
to the property in a more cost efficient manner than is currently required in the fifty
states.
While requiring an appraisal and sometimes a commercially reasonable sale
appears to add to the costs of the foreclosure process, in light of the data collected
in the Empirical study, it should actually operate to reduce costs. Based upon
surveys of appraisers in Chicago who handle residential real estate appraisals, the

91. Any junior mortgagees would also be served and given an opportunity to redeem the property.
92. See Stark, Facing the Facts, supra note 1, at 677-85 (detailing the two different methods to
accomplish a "commercially reasonable sale").
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cost of the appraisal should typically run from $200 to $300 and can be prepared
in a few days.93 If the appraisal shows that the borrower has insufficient equity in
the property, the property will be deeded to the lender on the date of the judgment
of foreclosure, thereby reducing the timing of the process by between four and five
months" (according to the Empirical study, it took a median of nine months from
the date the case was filed until the judicial sale was completed) and saving over
five percent of the judgment amount in costs (based upon saving approximately four
percent in accrued interest and advances which would otherwise accrue during the
period from the judgment until the sale and saving approximately one percent of the
judgment amount which would otherwise be expended in connection with costs to
perform the public sale).' In addition, allowing the lender to retake the property
more quickly when the borrower has no equity in the property may also lead to less
deterioration to the property, which commonly occurs during the foreclosure
process.
Borrowers would benefit from this bifurcated process because it would require
a commercially reasonable sale (and thus a bid price much more closely approximating the fair market value of the property) when the borrower has equity in
the mortgaged property and is unable to protect its equity by reinstating the loan or
paying off the loan prior to the foreclosure sale.9' If the property is worth $100,000
and the debt and sales costs together equal $90,000, the borrower's true equity in
the property is ten thousand dollars. Under the proposed process, the property
would sell for at or very near its market value of one hundred thousand dollars, the
lender would be paid off due to the commercially reasonable sale, and the borrower

93. The difference in cost is based upon how unique the house is that is being appraised. If there
are many unique features to the house then the appraisal cost could increase to as high as $600. Stark,
Facing the Facts, supra note 1, at 681 n.183.
94. See Stark, Facing the Facts, supra note 1, at 711.
95. See infra app. A, fig. A-12, A-13a, and A-13b for details on the costs associated with the
foreclosure process in the Empirical Study.
96. In some cases from the Empirical Study, resales of the property within one year after the
foreclosure sale reflect that some borrowers failed to protect their significant equity in their property
(some resales resulted in profits ranging from 32% to 326%). Stark, Facing the Facts, supra note 1, at
667. One possible explanation is that some borrowers are too ill or otherwise incompetent to protect their
interests in any of the ways that borrowers typically protect their equity such as through a sale of the
property, refinance or reinstatement of the loan, or the filing of a bankruptcy action. It is important to
require a commercially reasonable sale to protect such borrowers. It would also be helpful to require by
statute that at the time the borrower is served with the summons, the borrower also be supplied with an
explanation of the options available to a borrower in connection with the loan default. The exact wording
of the form could be prescribed by statute and would encourage the borrower to seek legal counsel to
advise the borrower on its options and to provide a summary of the options the borrower could consider
such as exercising the right of reinstatement, attempting to refinance or sell the property before the
redemption period expires, negotiating a loan work-out or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure with release of
personal liability, and bankruptcy options. The Uniform Land Security Interest Act takes a similar
approach and requires that the lender advise the borrower of various rights and options of the borrower
(such as any rights to cure the default and how to do so, the possibility of a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure,
any rights to sell the property subject to the debt or to refinance the debt) when the lender sends the
notice of default and intent to perform a foreclosure sale of the property. See Pedowitz, supra note 80,
at 58.
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would receive the net proceeds from the sale.' Under the proposed process,
lenders and third parties will be less likely to reap large profits in the occasional
situation where the borrower in fact has significant equity in the property but was
unable to reinstate or redeem the loan before the foreclosure sale. Furthermore,
since the costs to perform the appraisal are relatively minor (far less than the typical
current sales costs in Illinois for the selling officer and costs to advertise the sale),
it should not pose a barrier to the borrower being able to redeem the property prior
to the judgment of foreclosure or prior to the commercially reasonable sale, if
applicable. It is important for the law to require a commercially reasonable sale
because the Empirical Study reflects that the optional foreclosure features are rarely
utilized. 8 In none of the cases examined in the Empirical Study did the borrower
petition the court for any of the optional features allowed by the Illinois statute to
make the foreclosure sale more commercially reasonable. Lenders in the cases in
the study only petitioned for one feature, which related to having a private entity
rather than the Cook County Sheriffs Office conduct the foreclosure sale (to reduce
the costs of the foreclosure sale).
This proposal purposely leaves open the issue of recovering a deficiency, mainly
because the bifurcated process should work on its own to protect the borrower's
equity in the property. However, some states enact anti-deficiency legislation for
reasons other than protecting the borrower's equity in the property (e.g., to prevent
a double loss to the borrower when property values decline generally). Whether
federal concerns should preempt a state's policies on this issue is beyond the scope
of this article.
The proposed bifurcated foreclosure process would satisfy the federal
government's desire for a quick and inexpensive process (the proposal would lead
to a four month process in most cases without the costs associated with a sale of
the property), but would at the same time provide a meaningful opportunity for the
borrower to protect any equity it has in its property (by providing a judicial wake
up call, a ninety day reinstatement period, a four month period to redeem, and a
commercially reasonable sale if an appraisal reflects true equity in the property).
This author strongly urges Congress to replace the existing federal foreclosure
laws and to enact any new federal foreclosure laws based upon the bifurcated
foreclosure process outlined in this article and urges state legislators to consider
revising their residential foreclosure laws along the lines of the proposal outlined
in this article. Enactment of the reform proposal outlined in this article will promote
the interests of the federal government and lenders in a uniform and inexpensive
process and will simultaneously promote the legitimate interests of defaulting
borrowers in a realistic opportunity to protect their equity in their investment.

97. The statute should require a process to notify the borrower that the borrower is entitled to this
surplus amount and a procedure to collect this amount. Currently in Illinois, a borrower will not know
when a surplus is bid unless the borrower is at the foreclosure sale. Based on anecdotes from those who
represent lenders in the foreclosure process it appears that in a number of instances the borrower does
not in fact claim the surplus amount (presumably due to not knowing that a surplus was bid and that it
was entitled to it).
98. See Stark, Facing the Facts, supra note 1, at 670-71.
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APPENDIX A
FIGURE 5
1993

DISMISSED CASES

Fled by Sr. rfenholderRefied cases1%
Bankruptcy
Consent 5%
13%
2%

Workout
15%

Sold by defendant
16%

Deed in lieu
2%

Refinance
11%

Bankruptcy
Sold by defendant
Refinance
Redemption*
Reinstatement
Deed in lieu
Workout
Misc.
Consent
Refiled cases**
Filed by Sr. lienholder**
Total

1993
37
46
33
12
86
5
42
3
6
15
2
287

Mortgagee's motion to dismiss based on mortgagores exercise of the right of
redemption.
Mortgagee refiled complaint for foreclosure several months later, reflecting an
earlier dismissal of the case.
Complaint for foreclosure was filed by Senior lienholder, reflecting a dismissal of
the foreclosure case by the junior lienholder.
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FIGURE 6
1994 DISMISSED CASES
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Total
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59
31
21
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FIGURE 12
PERCENT OF COSTS RELATIVE TO FINAL JUDGMENT*
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Attorney Fees
Accrued Interest
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Cost of Suit
Selling Officer
Publication Fees

1993
1.52%
11.59%
3.85%
1.66%
0.40%
0.59%

1994
1.56%
10.44%
3.41%
2.05%
0.40%
0.57%
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FIGURE 13A
COMPARISON OF RATIO OF COSTS TO FINAL JUDGMENT
(DEFAULT TO JUDGMENT)
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Accrued Interest
Advances
Cost of Suit
Total

1994
1.36%
8.10%
1.83%
2.06%
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*See Figure 12

FIGURE 13B
COMPARISON OF RATIO OF COSTS To FINAL JUDGMENT
(JUDGMENT TO JUDICIAL SALE)

cc 2.5%
<2.00%
I,~

1.50%

LU I.OO*/
a.
0.50%.

Atton'qr

Aued

Fees

Interest

Advances"

Cost Of

Seg

Pubkaben

Sut

offker

Fee

COSTS
Costs Judgment to Judicial Safe*
1993
1994
Attorney Fees
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3.13%
2.99%
Advances
1.42%
0.97%
Cost of Suit
0.00%
0.00%
Selling officer
0.40%
0.40%
Publication Fee
0.59%
0.58%
Total
5.54%
4.94%
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FIGURE 14
COMPARISON OF VARIOUS COSTS*
$7OO.0O

$5,.0Ow

$4,0OO.O
U,00000
S00D0
$1,000.00

$-

TYPE OF COST

Advances
Cost of Suit
Accrued Interest
Publication Fee
Attorney Fee
Selling officer

1993
2,658.29
994.25
6,786.76
328.00
850.00
250.00

1994
2,067.01
1,106.98
5,215.41
328.00
800.00
250.00

* These amounts do not equal the summation of the amounts In Fig. 14a and Fig. 14b
because we did not have the same data for all the cases, thus resulting In minor
discrepencies. See footnote 73 of the article.
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FIGURE 15
COMPARISON OF NUMBER OF DAYS
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TABLE 1t
Nonjudicialand JudicialForeclosure
STATE

Alabama
-Nonjudicial
-Judicial
Alaska
-Nonjudicial
-Judicial

Time to
Complete
From Receipt
of Notice to
Foreclose*

Statutory
Redemption
Rights /Time
Period-

Reinstatement AntiRights/Time Deficiency
Period"Statutes****

30 days

1 year post-sale No

4-6 months if
not contested

1year post-sale No

90 days

No

Yes, pre-sale

6-8 months if 1 year from
Yes, pre-sale
no defenses
order
asserted
confirming sale
12-14 months if
defenses
asserted

Arizona
-Nonjudicial

90 days

No

-Judicial

4-18 months

6 months post- Yes, pre-sale
sale (ifnot
agricultural and
abandoned,
then 30 days

Yes, pre-sale

One-Action
Rule ....

No (NJ)(J)

No (NJ)(J)

Yest (NJ)

No (NJ)

No (J)

No (J)

No2 (NJ)(J)

No (NJ)(J)

1post-sale)

t. Information derived from the Fifty State Digest.
* As a practical matter - court delays, etc. Median time for Nonjudicial proceeding is two
months. Median time forjudicial proceeding is eight months. To the extent the reports forast~te provided
a range of time, these median figures are calculated using the average time within the reported range.
** Median - six months post-sale.
*** "Pre-sale" means any time up to the date of sale.
**** "Anti-Deficiency Statute" means, as used herein, that if a foreclosure sale yields less than the
mortgage debt, the mortgagee is not permitted to obtain ajudgment for the difference against the mortgagor
(unless stated otherwise in a footnote).
***** "One-Action Rule," as used herein, means that a creditor is required to pursue its remedies
against a defaulting borrower in a single action, and cannot sue the debtor for personal liability until the
security has been exhausted (unless stated otherwise in a footnote).
1. The statute prohibits an action or judgment against the maker, surety, or guarantor on the
obligation secured by the deed of trust.
2. However, deficiency judgments are prohibited with respect to loans for the payment of the
balance of the purchase price or to secure a loan to pay all or part of the purchase price of residential
property of 2.5 acres or less.
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STATE

Arkansas
-Nonjudicial
-Judicial

Time to
Complete
From Receipt
of Notice to
Foreclose*

Statutory
Redemption
Rights / Time
Period"

Reinstatement AntiRights/Time
Deficiency
Statutes-"
Period-

60 days

No

Yes, pre-sale

Yes, pre-sale
At least 50 days Pre-sale and
Post-sale within
1 year
(Waivable)

No3 (NJ)

No (NJ)

No (J)

Yes (J)

Yes (NJ)

California
-Nonjudicial

90 days

Yes, 3 months
pm-sale.

Yes, 5 days
prior to sale.

Yes (NJ)

-Judicial

3months to 5

Yes, 1 year

Yes, presale.

No 4(J)

years

post-sale

4-8 months

60 days presale

Minimum 6
months if
contested
3 months if
uncontested

75 days postYes, pre-sale
sale; however,
6 months postsale if
"agricultural
real estate"

Colorado
-Nonjudicial
-Judicial

One-Action
Rule..

Yes, up to I
No (NJ)(J)
day prior to sale

Yes- (J)

No (NJ)(J)

3. However, a deficiency action must be filed within 12 months of sale date.
4. However, no deficiency is available after foreclosure, whetherbyjudicial sale orby trustee's sale,
if (1) the debt is one that was given to a vendor to evidence the unpaid balance of the sales price or (2) the
property being foreclosed upon is a one-to-four unit dwelling occupied by the borrower and the debt was
incurred to pay all or part of the purchase price therefor. No deficiency is available "upon a note secured
by a deed of trust or mortgage upon real property or an estate for years therein" after a sale of the property
or estate for years pursuant to the trustee's power of sale. In addition, if a deficiency is permitted, it is
subject to a fair value limitation.
5. Section 726, subdivision (a) provides in part: "There can be but one form of action for the
recovery of any debt or the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage upon real property ... in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter." "Asjudicially construed, section 726 is both a 'securityfirst' and 'one-action' rule: "It compels the secured creditor, in a single action, to exhaust his security
judicially before he may obtain a monetary 'deficiency' judgment against the debtor." O'Neil v. General
Security Corp. 4 Cal. App.4h 587, 597 (1992). In operation, the one form of action rule applies to any
proceedings or action by the beneficiary for the recovery of the debt, or enforcement of any right, secured
by a mortgage or deed of trust. The only "action" that is permitted is foreclosure; any other "action" is a
violation of the rule that invokes severe sanctions." If the secured creditor seeks a personal money
judgment against the debtor without seeking foreclosure of the mortgage or deed of trust, this is an election
of remedies, and the creditor thereby waives the right to foreclose on the security or sell the security under
a power of sale. See Walker v. Community Bank, 10 Cal.3d 729, 733 (1974).
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Connecticut
-Nonjudicial
-Judicial
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Time to
Complete
From Receipt
of Notice to
Foreclose*

Statutory
Redemption
Rights /Time
Period"

Reinstatement AntiRights/ Time Deficiency
Period"
Statutes"

One-Action
Rule .....

Not Available

N/A

N/A

N/A (NJ)

N/A (NJ)
7

Approximately
I100 days

At leas 20
days pre-sale

No

No (J)

Yes (J)

Delaware
-Nonjudicial

Not Available

N/A

N/A

N/A (NJ)

N/A (NJ)

-Judicial

3-4 months

At least 3
No
weeks pre-sale.

No (J)

No (J)

D.C.
-Nonjudicial

40 days

At least 30
days pre-sale.

Yes, pro-sale

No (NJ)

No (NJ)

Generally not
done

N/A

N/A

N/A (J)

N/A (J)

Florida
-Nonjudicial

Not Available

N/A

N/A

N/A (NJ)

N/A (NJ)

-Judicial

3-6 months

Before the sale No
to 10 days after
the sale

No (J)

No(J)

Georgia
-Nonjudicial
-Judicial

4 weeks
1-3 years

1 year post-sale No
Iyear post-sale No

No'°(NJ)(J)

No (NJ)(J)

1 month
minimum

No statutory
right of
redemption

Yes, approx. 5
weeks pre-sale

No (NJ)(J)

No (NJ)(J)

No statutory
right of
redemption

Yes, at least 3
weeks pre-sale
I

-Judicial

Hawaii
-Nonjudicial

-Judicial
5-6 months

I

6. Where the table states "at least" a certain length of time, this is done because no time period is
set forth in the statute for the redemption. However, there is a minimum time period set forth in the statute
between the time notice is sent up to the date of sale, and also the publication time period.
7. A deficiency judgment may be obtained if the person having an obligation to pay in connection
with the underlying note was cited as a defendant in the foreclosure action.
8. See supra note 6.
9. See supra note 6.
10. No deficiency can be obtained unless confirmed by superior court action finding that sale was
fairly held and that property brought its fair market value.
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STATE

Idaho
-Nonjudicial

-Judicial

Illinois
-Nonjudicial

Time to
Complete
From Receipt
of Notice to
Foreclose

Statutory
Redemption
Rights / Time
Period"

Reinstatement Anti.
Deficiency
Rights/Time
Statutes
Period-

One-Action
Rule.

125-140 days

No

Yes, within 115 Yes (Ni)(J)
days from date
notice of
default is
recorded.

Yes (NJ)(J)

60 days or more 6 months for
real property of
20 acres or less
post-sale.
Above that
acreage is I
year post-sale.

Yes, within 115
days from date
notice of
default is
recorded.

Not Available

N/A

9 months to 1
year with a
minimum of 90
days

Yes, pre-sale
7 months
residential presale; 6 months
commercial
pre-sale
_
(Waivable)"

Not Available

N/A

NIA

6 weeks to
6months

2
At least 20
days pre-sale

Yes, pre-sale

Iowa
-Nonjudicia

60 days

30 days postsale

No

-Judicial

12-18 months

Up to I year
post-sale

No

Kansas
-Nonjudicial
-Judicial

Not Available
6- 18 months

N/A
12 months
post-sale
(Waivable)

N/A
Yes, pre-sale

-Judicial

Indiana
-Nonjudicial
-Judicial

NIA

NIA (NJ)

N/A (NJ)

No (J)

No (J)

No (NJ)(J)

No (NJ)(J)

No (NJ)(J)

No (NJ)(J)

N/A (NJ)
No (J)

N/A (NJ)
Yes13 (i)

11. If the mortgagee, as the purchaser, bids less than the debt amount, the borrower is granted a 30
day post-sale redemption period. This is for residential only.
12. See supra note 6.
13. A form of one-action exists. This rule uses the doctrine of res judicata to preclude a party from
suing another party more than once on the same claim. Bringing an action to enforce a promissory note
without simultaneously seeking to foreclose under the mortgage securing the note may result in a waiver
of the lender's right to enforce the mortgage.
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Time to
Complete
From Receipt
of Notice to
Foreclose

Statutory
Redemption
Rights / Time
Period-

Reinstatement AntiRights/Time
Deficiency
Period"
Statutes"

One-Action
Rule"....

Not Available

N/A

N/A

N/A (NJ)

N/A (NJ)

4- 6 months at
a minimum

I year post-sale No

No (J)

No (J)

Louisiana
-Nonjudicial

Not Available

N/A

N/A

N/A (NJ)

N/A (NJ)

-Judicial

45-90 days

No

No

No (J)

No (J)

Power of sale 30 to 45 days

Power of sale - No
No; Foreclosure

No (NJ)(J)

No (NJ)(J)

No(NJ)(J)

No (NJ)(J)

Kentucky
-Nonjudicial
-Judicial

Maine
-Nonjudicial

(only used with by notice - I

-Judicial

Maryland
-Nonjudicial

corporations).
Foreclosure by
notice 4 - 60
days (rarely
used).

year post-sale

6-9 months

90 days from
date of
judgment

No

60-75 days for

No

Yes, pre-sale

60-75 days for No
sale ratification
plus
40-60 days for
audit
ratification.
I

Yes, pre-sale

sale ratification
plus
40-60 days for
audit
ratification.
-Judicial

I

14. "Foreclosure by notice" means that, after breach of the condition, the mortgagee or any person
claiming under him may proceed for the purpose of foreclosure in either of the following modes: (1) By
giving public notice in a newspaper of general circulation in the county or adjoining county for 3 weeks
successively of his claim by mortgage on such real estate, to be recorded within 30 days after such notice.
(2) By causing an attested copy of such notice to be served on the mortgagor(s), if he lives in the State, by
the sheriff of the county where the mortgagor resides, by delivering it to him in hand or leaving it at his last
and usual place of abode, to be recorded within 30 days after such service. See ME. REV. STAT.ANN. tit.
14, § 6203.
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Time to
Complete
From Receipt
of Notice to
Foreclose"

Statutory
Redemption
Rights / Time
Period"

Reinstatement AntiDeficiency
Rights/Time
Statutes-.
Period'

One-Action
Rule.

5-12 weeks

5
At least" 3
weeks pre-sale

No (NJ)(J)e
No, unless
document states
otherwise

No (NJ)(J)

2 months

6 months postsale

No

7 1/2 months

6 months, post- No
sale

-Judicial

Minimum 13
months

6 months postsale

Minnesota
-Nonjudicial

2 months

STATE

Massachusetts
-Nonjudicial

-Judicial
(rarely used)
Michigan
-Nonjudicial

No(NJ)(J)

Yes (NJ)(J)

6 mos post-sale Yes, pre-sale

No (NJ)

Yes (NJ)

11 months

6 mos post-sale Yes, pre-sale

No (J)

No (J)

Mississippi
-Nonjudicial

6 weeks

No

-Judicial
(rarely used)

Lengthy
proceeding

No
Yes, if
installment
obligation, presale. (Terms set
by the court.)

Missouri
-Nonjudicial

45-60 days

No(NJ)(J)
I year post-sale No, unless
stated otherwise
in the loan
documents.

Lengthy

proceding

6 months post- No
sale

1 month

I year post-sale No

Yes (NJ)

Yes (NJ)

Minimum 3
months

1 year post-sale No

No (J)

Yes (J)

Yes, pre-sale

-Judicial

-Judicial
(rarely used)
Montana
-Nonjudicial
-Judicial

15. See supra note 6.
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Nebraska
-Nonjudicial
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Time to
Complete
From Receipt
of Notice to
Foreclose"

Statutory
Redemption
Rights /Time
Period"

3-4 months.
No
Farm property 4-5 months

Reinstatement AntiRights/ Time Deficiency
Period'
Statutes""

One-Action
Rule ....

Yes, w/in 1
No (NJ)(J)
month of notice
of default.
Farm prop w/in
2 months.

Yes (NJ)(J)

-Judicial

4-6 months

Yes, at least 16 4 Yes
months presale.

Nevada
-Nonjudicial

3 months

No

-Judicial

Rarely used.

1 year post-sale No

New
Hampshire
-Nonjudicial

25 days

No

Yes, pre-sale

1 year and
several months

No

No

Not available

N/A

N/A

-Judicial
New Jersey
-Nonjudicial
-Judicial

Not specified

Yes, within 35
days of notice
of default

Yes (NJ)(J)

Yes (NJ)(J)

No(NJ)(J)

No (NJ)(J)

N/A (NJ)

N/A (NJ)

8

10 days
post17

Yes, pro-sale

Yes' (J)

No (J)

180 days, does
not include
residential
property

No

Yes, up to 1
day prior to
sale.

No(NJ)(J)

No (NJ)(J)

90-120 days

9 months postsale

Yes, pre-sale

sale.
New Mexico
-Nonjudicial

-Judicial

16. See supra note 6.
17. A deficiency judgment revives the post-sale redemption period for another 6 months.
18. Pertains only to residential.
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Reinstatement AntiRights/Time Deficiency
Statutes*...
Period-

One-Action
Rule .....

No2 (NJ)(J)

22
Yes (NJ)(J)

Time to
Complete
From Receipt
of Notice to
Foreclose*

Statutory
Redemption
Rights /Time
Period"

New York
-Nonjudicial

4-6 months

Yes, at least
12 weeks presale

-Judicial

12-18 months

Yes, at least" 3 No
12 weeks presale

STATE

North Carolina
40 days
-Nonjudicial

9

10 days postsale

[Vol. 51:229

No

No 2 (NJ)(J)
No, unless
stated otherwise
in the loan
documents.
No

-Judicial

2-3 years

Yes, 30 days
pre-sale

North Dakota
-Nonjudicial

Not available

N/A

-Judicial

3-4 months

I year post-sale Yes, pre-sale

Ohio
-Nonjudicial

Not available

N/A

-Judicial

6 mos. - 1 year

N/A

N/A

2-4 weeks post- No
I

No (NJ)(J)

N/A (NJ)

N/A (NJ)

No (J)

Yes (J)

N/A (NJ)

N/A (NJ)

No(J)

No (J)

_sale

19. See supra note 6.
20. See supra note 6.
21. If mortgagee elects to foreclose, it may recover any deficiency from the maker or guarantor of the
note by (1) naming the maker or guarantor as a defendant in the foreclosure action and properly serving it;
and. (2) moving for ajudgment for the deficiency within 90 days after foreclosure sale is completed. Failure
to seek deficiency judgment in the foreclosure action bars any further action for the deficiency.
22. According to the Fifty State Digest, a mortgagee is generally not permitted to sue at law on the
note or on any guaranty at the note and at the same time to sue in equity to foreclose the mortgage (the
foreclosure proceeding would have to be by leave ofthe court unless final judgement has been rendered and
at execution [which may only be directed at the property of the defendant other than the mortgaged
premises] has been returned wholly or partly unsatisfied). Some New York real estate attorneys argue that
New York law does not have a "one-action rule" and disagree with the Fifty State Digest on this issue.
23. The anti-deficiency statute relates only to purchase money mortgages given by buyers of real
estate to their sellers to secure the purchase money debt, and protects the purchaser /borrower, including
a co-maker who has an interest in the real estate. The statute does not exclude commercial transactions.
In a non-purchase money context, action for deficiency must be commenced within one year of foreclosure.
24. The action to obtain the deficiency judgment must be brought within ninety days after the sale.
The amount of the deficiency judgment actually does not have a direct connection to the amount bid at the
sheriff's salebut rather is an amount determined by ajury to be the difference between the fair value of the
mortgaged premises and debt previously adjudged due.
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STATE

FORECLOSING ON THEAMERICAN DREAM

Time to
Complete
From Receipt
of Notice to
Foreclose

Statutory
Redemption
Rights / Time
Period-

Reinstatement AntiRights/Time
Deficiency
Period'"
Statutes....

One-Action
Rule ....

75 days - 9
months

Yes, at leastn
35 days presale

No, unless
Yes (NJ)(J)
stated in the
loan documents

Yes (NJ)(J)

90 days - 9

Yes, at least" 6 No

months

months pre-sale

150 days

No

Yes, up to 5
days prior to
sale.

120 days - 1
year

180 days postsale

Yes, pre-sale

Pennsylvania
-Nonjudicial

Not available

N/A

-Judicial

I - 3 years

Rhode Island
-Nonjudicial
-Judicial

Oklahoma
-Nonjudicial

-Judicial
Oregon
-Nonjudicial

-Judicial

Yes (NJ)(J)

No (NJ)(J)

N/A

N/A (NJ)

N/A (NJ)

At leastP 30
days pre-sale

No

No (J)

No (J)

41 days

No

No

No (NJ)

No (NJ)

Not available

N/A

N/A

N/A (J)

N/A (J)

South Carolina
-Nonjudicial
Not available

N/A

N/A

N/A (NJ)

N/A (NJ)

-Judicial

Minimum of
I100 days

No

No

No (J)

Yes8 (J)

South Dakota
-Nonjudicial

30-50 days

Under 40 acres Yes, pre-sale
- 180 days postsale; over 40
acres - I year
post-sale

Yes (NJ)(J)

Yes (NJ)(J)

-Judicial

75-90 days

Under 40 acres Yes, pre-sale
- 180 days postsale; over 40
acres - I year
post-sale

25. See supra note 6.
26. See supra note 6.
27. See supra note 6.
28. Not clear, but case law suggests the existence of a one-action rule with respect to suits on notes
and mortgages.
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STATE

Time to
Complete
From Receipt
of Notice to
Foreclose"

Statutory
Redemption
Rights /Time
Period"

Reinstatement AntiRights/ Time Deficiency
PeriodStatutes'"

Tennessee
-Nonjudicial

21 days

Yes, at least 9
Yes, only if
25 days preprior to
sale (Waivable) acceleration

-Judicial
(rarely used)

6 months- 1
year

2 years post-

Texas
-Nonjudicial

1-3 months

One-Action
Rule.

No (NJ)(J)

No (NJ)(J)

No, except for
IRS, which has
120 days postsale

No, unless
No (NJ)(J)
stated otherwise
inthe loan
documents.

No (NJ)(J)

3 years

No

No, unless
stated otherwise
in the loan
documents.

Utah
-Nonjudicial

120 days

No

Yes for 90 days Yes (NJ)(J)
after filing of
default notice.

-Judicial

5-6 months

6 months, post- Yes
sale (Not
waivable)

Vermont
-Nonjudicial

Not available

N/A

N/A

N/A (NJ)

N/A (NJ)

6 months - I
year

6 months presale

No

No (J)

No (J)

Virginia
-Nonjudicial

4-8 weeks

Yes, at least'
40 days presale

No, unless
No (NJ)
provided for in
loan documents

No (NJ)

-Judicial

Not available

N/A

N/A

N/A (J)

N/A (J)

Washington
-Nonjudicial

190 days

No

Yes, up to I I
days prior to
sale.

Yes (NJ)(J)

Yes (NJ)(J)

-Judicial

18-24 months

1 year post-sale Yes, pre-sale

I

I

-Judicial
(rarely used)

-Judicial

No

sale

29. See supra note 6.
30. See supra note 6.
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Yes (NJ)(J)

1998]
STATE

West Virginia
-Nonjudicial

-Judicial

FORECLOSING ON THE AMERICAN DREAM

Time to
Complete
From Receipt
of Notice to
Foreclose

Statutory
Redemption
Rights /Time
Period"

Information not Yes, at least 3'
available
50 days presale

Reinstatement AntiRights/Time Deficiency
PeriodStatutes*"*

One-Action
Rule...

No

No (NJ)(J)

No (NJ)(J)

N/A (NJ)

N/A (NJ)

No

Information not Yes, terms set
by the judge

_available

Wisconsin
-Nonjudicial

Abolished in
WI.

N/A

N/A

6 months - 1

6 months post- No
sale

Yes Q)

Yes

year
6 months (or
less)

90 days postsale

Yes, pre-sale

No(NJ)(J)

No (NJ)(J)

6-12 months

90 days post-

Yes, pre-sale
I

I

I

-Judicial

Wyoming
-Nonjudicial
-Judicial

sale

31. See supra note 6.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998

)

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol51/iss2/3

